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UNITED STATES v. BROWN SHOE CO.-
A NEW TEST FOR SECTION 7?
The Clayton Act was designed to strike down certain anticompeti-
tive practices in their incipiency, before their continued use would
lead to monopoly power., Specifically, the act was aimed at price
discrimination,2 exclusive dealing and tie-in contracts,3 mergers, 4
and interlocking directorates,5 where the effect of such practices
might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
The most recent implementation of this policy was effected by the
passage of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950,6 which
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Although law reviews have
poured out a wealth of articles discussing and interpreting the Anti-
merger Act,7 and the Government, as of October 1960, has brought
sixty-four cases under it," only one of these has reached the Supreme
Court,9 and it was limited by its particular facts.
The Antimerger Act,"' designed to cure the alleged deficiencies in
old Section 7, provides in relevant part:
1. See Edwards, The Price Discrimination Law 5 (1959); American Crystal
Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 526 (2d Cir. 1958),
affirming, 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. 3-4 (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by 49 Stat. 1526
(1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958).
3. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
4. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
5. 38 Stat. 732 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
6. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
7. See, e.g., Celler, The New Antimerger Statute: The Current Lookout, 36
A.B.A.J. 897 (1951); Stewart & Turner, Significance of Oligopoly in Acquisition
and Exclusive Dealing Situations Under the Clayton Act, 25 U. Cinc. L. Rev.
427 (1956); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 176 (1955); Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History,
52 Colum. L. Rev. 766 (1952); Note, Quantitative or Qualitative-The Current
Dilemma of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 44 Geo. L.J. 478 (1956) ; Note, Section
Seven of the Clayton Act: Undefined Weapon Against Incipient Monopolies,
4 Kan. L. Rev. 449 (1956).
8. Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 15 Record of N.Y.C.
B.A. 362, 376 (1960).
9. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S.
458 (1960).
10. To avoid confusion, amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act will be referred
to as the Antimerger Act in the remaining portion of this article.
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No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capi-
tal and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition,
or to tend to create a monopoly.:"
The problem of interpreting the qualifying clause, "may be
substantially to lessen competition," has given rise to a spirited
controversy concerning the proper standard of illegality to be applied
to mergers coming within the purview of the Antimerger Act.
Professor Handler articulates the problem specifically: "Is this effect
[substantial lessening of competition condemned by the Act] to be
measured quantitatively by the amount of competition disappearing
as a result of a merger, or qualitatively by an economic analysis to
determine whether there has been any impairment of the strength,
health, vigor, and effectiveness of competitive forces in the market."'1
The doctrine of "quantitative substantiality" originated in the
cases which arose under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,13 which out-
laws exclusive dealing and tie-in contracts, and contains the identical
qualifying clause of Section 7. In the International Salt case,"
involving a tying agreement in connection with the leasing of salt
machines, the Court held that an annual sales volume of $500,000 in
the "tied" product was not "insignificant or insubstantial,"" and
found a violation of the statute without any further investigation of
the actual foreclosure of competitors from the market. Two years
later, "quantitative substantiality" came to full fruition in the
famous Stantdard Stations case."- Defendant had exclusive supply
contracts with sixteen per cent of the retail gasoline stations, selling
6.7 per cent of the gasoline,1 in a seven-state area in the West."'
Standard's six main competitors had similar exclusive supply con-
tracts, and together, the seven major oil companies controlled seventy-
six per cent of all the outlets in the area. 9 Although Standard offered
evidence to show that there was no substantial lessening of competi-
tion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, held that
11. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
12. Handler, Antitrust in Perspective 58 (1957).
13. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
14. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
15. Id. at 396.
16. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
17. Id. at 295.
18. Ibid.
19. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 Yale
L.J. 1, 25 (1959).
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such evidence was immaterial once it had been shown that competi-
tion had been foreclosed in a substantial share of the market.
20
Kessler and Stern have stated the rule of the case, and the rule of
"quantitative substantiality" to be: "[W]hen competitors are fore-
closed from a substantial enough share of the market, it is not far-
fetched to infer substantial lessening of competition." 21
There is, of course, a substantial difference between "quantitative
substantiality" as used in International Salt and "quantitative sub-
stantiality" as used in Standard Stations. In the former case, the
Court was only concerned with the dollar volume and found it to be
"not insubstantial." In the latter case, however, the Court considered
the percentage of the market which Standard controlled through its
exclusive supply contracts, and in so doing considered, at least in small
part, the relevant economic factors involved. In other words, the
doctrine of "quantitative substantiality" as stated in Standard Sta-
tions involves to some extent a qualitative investigation.22
The du Pont-General Motors case23 showed an intent by the Court
to apply the same test to both Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.
The case was brought under old Section 724 which had been consid-
ered inapplicable to vertical mergers by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, ; the Justice Department3 and the Congress.27 In the du Pont-
General Motors case, "[T] he Supreme Court discarded forty years of
uniform interpretation and ruled that the scope of the original
statute was not confined to horizontal acquisitions. ' 12 8 The Court
cited Standard Stations and indicated that the statutory tests appli-
cable to Section 3 were also applicable to Section 7.
Proponents of "quantitative substantiality" urge that application
of this test to a merger case is in line with Congressional 'intent as
evidenced by the committee reports on the Act,29 and more impor-
tant, that it has the effect of stopping a merger which threatens the
competitive health of the economy, with swiftness and dispatch, thus
20. 337 U.S. at 313-14.
21. Kessler & Stern, supra note 19, at 28.
22. Oppenheim, Book Review, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 1100, 1102-03 (1958).
23. United States v. E. L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
24. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914).
25. FTC Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 168 (1955).
26. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 590
(1957).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
28. Handler, op. cit. supra note 12, at 50.
29. H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
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comporting with the over-all policy of stopping anti-competitive acts
in their incipiency30
The Federal Trade Commission and the Attorney General's Com-
mittee have specifically rejected "quantitative substantiality" as
applied to Section 731 and Section 332 cases, and have adopted the
doctrine of "qualitative substantiality" as the correct statutory test.
This doctrine finds its best expression in Pillsbury Mills, Inc.,13
the first case considered by the Federal Trade Commission under the
act. Here, the Commission interpreted the act as requiring "a case-
by-case examination of all relevant factors in order to determine the
probable economic consequences [of the merger]. ' ' 4 Although this
approach has been highly criticized as requiring an "economic ex-
travaganza" 35 in every merger case, it appears to have more merit
than the per se approach of the "quantitative substantialists." As
Professor Handler and others have pointed out,3- mergers are neither
good nor evil when examined in a vacuum. Each one is presented
against the background of its own particular market and should be
judged on its own particular merits, within the framework of the act.
The recent case of United States v. Brown Shoe Co.,37 is particularly
interesting, because it appears that the district court applied an
entirely different test than those discussed above, and in so doing
30. Celler, Corporation Mergers and Antitrust Laws, 7 Mercer L. Rev. 267(1956). See Interim Report on Corporate and Bank Mergers, Antitrust Sub-
committee of the House Judiciary Committee, 84 Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1955).
For a view that the committee reports are "obscure, ambiguous and inconclusive"
and if anything show congressional intent to require application of the doctrine
of "qualitative substantiality," see Handler, Quantitative Substantiality and
the Celler-Kefauver Act-A Look at the Record, 7 Mercer L. Rev. 279, 287
(1956).
The cases of Dictograph Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954),
affirming 50 F.T.C. 281 (1953), and Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867
(7th Cir. 1954), affirming 50 F.T.C. 681 (1954) seem to represent modified
applications of the rule of "quantitative substantiality" as defined in Standard
Stations. See generally Kessler and Stern, supra note 19, at 42.
31. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953); Crown Zellerbach Corp., Trade
Reg. Rep. (1957-1958 FTC Cas.) 1 26923 (1957); Brillo Mfg. Co., FTC Dkt.
6557, Trade Reg. Rep. 27243 (1958); Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep.
122-25 (1955).
32. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953); Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep.
145-49 (1955).
33. 50 F.T.C. 555 (1953).
34. Id. at 565.
35. Interim Report on Corporate and Bank Mergers, supra note 30, at 23.
36. Handler, op. cit. supra note 12, at 68-69; Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust
Rep. 124-25 (1955).
37. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721 (E.D. Mo. 1959), prob.
juris. noted, 363 U.S. 825 (1960).
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has materially strengthened the Antimerger Act in its purpose of
"check [ing] anticompetitive acts in their incipiency. . ... 38
In November of 1955, the United States obtained a temporary
restraining order forbidding Brown from acquiring the stock of
the G. R. Kinney Co., Inc., (hereinafter referred to as Kinney) the
largest "family shoe store chain in the nation." '39 In January of
1956, the restraining order was vacated and the acquisition
allowed on the condition that Kinney be operated as a separate
entity.2" The merger, under these terms, was effected on May 1,
1960. At the trial, in August of 1958, the government prevailed in
its contention that the acquisition of Kinney, which produced 0.5%
and sold 1.2% of the nation's shoes, by Brown, which accounted for
5% of the total shoe production, was a violation of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. 1
The court found that Brown had been a leading manufacturer of
men's, women's and children's shoes since 1877.42 Between 1929 and
1945 Brown had experimented with ownership or control of retail
outlets, but had found them unprofitable and disposed of them all by
1945.' Between 1945 and 1951 Brown distributed its shoes through
independent retailers, chain stores and mail order houses.44
In 1951, Brown began acquiring various retail and manufacturing
concerns, including the Wohl Shoe Co. in 1951;45 the Weatherby-
Kayser Shoe Co. in 1953;' and the Regal Shoe Co. in 1954.47 In
1956, after the acquisition of Kinney, Brown became the third
largest unit in the shoe industry in terms of sales, manufacturing
and total assets,'1 and by 1958 owned or controlled 1,820 retail out-
lets."
During this period of expansion by acquisition and merger, there
was a marked increase in the sale of Brown's products to its sub-
sidiaries, and a corresponding decrease in the sales of other manu-
facturers to these subsidiaries.5
38. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1958).
39. 179 F. Supp. 721, 727 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
40. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cases 68244 (E.D. Mo.
1956). The court specifically refused to apply the "quantitative substantiality"
test of Standard Stations.
41. 179 F. Supp. 721, 741 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
42. Id. at 724.
43. Ibid.
44. Id. at 724-25.
45. Id. at 725.
46. Id. at 726.
47. Id. at 72a
48. Id. at 727
49. Id. at 737 n.9.
50. Id. at 725-27.
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Brown, however, has not been the only member of the shoe
industry moving toward vertical integration." As a matter of fact,
there has been a general movement in the industry which is still
continuing in this same direction. 52 The large manufacturers have
been steadily increasing their ownership of retail outlets, and al-
though the court expressly found that "no one manufacturer, no
one retailer, no one manufacturer-retailer combined, has a large
percentage of the market, wholesale or retail . . . . 53 it also found
that "a small group of firms control a sizeable segment of the
market."54
Analysis of the case reveals that although the court found that
the merger would substantially lessen competition in the relevant
market 55 as the court defined it,"6 the main reason for its holding
that the merger was in violation of the act, was the trend in the
industry toward monopoly, or to be more accurate, oligopoly. The
court gave great weight to Brown's previous acquisitions, and ex-
amined the Kinney merger squarely against the background of
Brown's prior actions.
It appears, that had the test of "quantitative substantiality" been
applied, there would have been no violation. Judge Weber admits
that the percentages involved were minute.'2 ' It is highly unlikely
that an advocate of "quantitative substantiality" could find that the
acquisition of a firm with 1.2% of the nation's shoe sales by one with
5% of the total shoe production would amount to a per se violation
because of a substantial foreclosure of the market to competitors.
On the other hand, it is not clear that a "qualitative substantiality"
test, as usually applied would have resulted in a violation in this
case. As previously noted, Judge Weber rested the great weight
of his holding on the trend in the industry toward monopoly as
evidenced by the past acquisitions of the large firms and particularly
Brown. Professor Handler, considered by most to be the leading
exponent of the "qualitative substantiality" doctrine, has taken great
issue with the court's approach in Brown Shoe on the ground that
the language of the act makes it "abundantly clear that the forbidden
effects must result from the challenged acquisition and not from any
51. See, e.g., Kester, International Shoe Borrows to Expand Retail Outlets,
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Nov. 10, 1960, § c, p. 7, col. 2.
52. 179 F. Supp. at 737.
53. Id. at 739-40.
54. Id. at 740.
55. Id. at 739.
56. The court's analysis of the relevant market ("any line of commerce in
any section of the country") has been criticized by Handler, supra note 8, at
377-78.
57. 179 F. Supp. at 737. See also note 40 supra.
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others." - Whether Judge Weber did this because he felt that a
close analysis of the impact of this particular merger would not
indicate a violation, is, of course, a matter of conjecture. In any
event, it does seem fair to say that there is no clear indication from
the facts of the case that application of the "qualitative substantial-
ity" test would result in a holding by the court that the acquisition
was in violation of the statute.
In summary, it seems doubtful that either test, as usually applied,
would have resulted in a finding of a violation in this case.
Let us assume for a moment that Judge Weber had found no
violation or that the Supreme Court reverses him in the coming
months. If Judge Weber has analyzed the trend in the industry
correctly, then we may expect to find an increasing amount of power
coming into the hands of the large integrated shoe firms, and finally,
within the not too distant future judging by the present rate of
growth, a full blown oligopoly in the industry.
Brown Shoe would then appear to represent the unusual situation
in which a leading firm is found to be heading in the direction of
great economic power and control of an industry which itself is
moving inexorably toward an oligopolistic structure, and yet is not
subject to the sanctions of the antitrust laws designed to stop exactly
this type of conduct, because neither of the tests which have been
applied under the act are applicable.
The characteristics of an oligopolistic market structure, where a
small number of large firms control a large segment of the market,59
are definitely anticompetitive. Conformity among oligopolists,
whether conscious or unconscious, is a salient characteristic of the
market.-I Price competition is generally nonexistent because it is
uneconomic.A31 As a result, price is usually set by the dominant mem-
ber of the oligopoly at a level above that at which a competitive
market would set it, and then followed by the other members of the
market.> The oligopolist functions, therefore, like a monopolist, but
usually without the hazards of the antitrust laws.63
An eminent authority has pointed out in a recent article that
American antitrust law has been "equivocal and ineffective" in its
58. Handler, supra note 8, at 380.
59. Kaysen & Turner Antitrust Policy-An Economic and Legal Analysis
27 (1959).
60. See Lindahl & Carter, Corporate Concentration and Public Policy 388-
408 (3d ed. 1959); Dow, The Supreme Court, The "New Competition," and
"Reasonable Behavior," 13 Okla. L. Rev. 174, 177 (1960).
61. Lindahl & Carter, op. cit. supra note 60, at 393-94.
62. Id. at 397-98.
63. Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business 845 (1955).
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response to the problem of oligopoly.04 In its "ineffective and
equivocal fashion," Antitrust has dealt with mature oligopolies by
developing such devices as "exclusive dealing,"0 5 "price leadership,"00
"conscious parallelism" 67 and "intra-enterprise conspiracy."0 8  As
proof extant that these devices have been less than completely effec-
tive, one can turn to such oligopolistic industries as steel,69 alumi-
num,70 automobiles,71 salt72 and meat products, 73 to mention just a
few. A number of suggestions have been put forward for control of
full blown oligopolies, all of which, however, require substantial
amendments to the presently existing law.74
The discussion above would seem to indicate that under the present
interpretation of the antitrust laws, the government has poor weap-
ons for dealing with oligopolists and none for dealing with incipient
oligopolists who advance toward their goal by a series of small
acquisitions rather than by merger with other giants in their in-
dustry.
In view of the probable failure of either of the two major tests
under the act, when applied to the Brown Shoe situation, it appears
that Judge Weber's test which goes beyond the impact of the par-
ticular merger before the court, and enlarges the permissible scope
of the inquiry to include the previous acquisitions of the company
and the trend in the industry, is useful, reasonable and worthy of
adoption. The economy can not countenance the continuous, gradual
64. Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 31, 41 (1960).
65. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, (Standard Stations) 337 U.S. 293
(1949) (defendant controlled twenty-three percent of the sales in its region
and all other major suppliers followed its practices).
66. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (largest
three cigarette companies followed each other's prices).
67. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) (common
terms of licensing second run showings of films of dominant movie producers).
68. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211
(1951) (parent and subsidiaries ordered not to collaborate on prices).
69. The twelve largest companies control 83% of the industry capacity.
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
70. The "big three" (Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser) control 96% of the virgin
aluminum market. Lindahl & Carter, op. cit. supra note 60, at 219.
71. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler produce over 95% of the automobiles
sold in the United States. Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust
Laws and the Automobile Industry, 8 Stan. L. Rev. 594, 616 (1956).
72. The eight largest companies control 93% of the market. Kaysen &
Turner, op. cit. supra note 59, at 280.
73. The three largest firms control 64% of the industry's net capital assets.
FTC Report on the Concentration of Productive Facilities 17 (1947).
74. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 64, at 47; Kaysen & Turner, op. cit. supra
note 59, at 111-41.
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foreclosure of competition, merely because the available tests for
interpretation of the act are inadequate; since in the long run, the
effects are identical with the conduct which the act would strike
down.
Perhaps a final quote from Judge Weber will best illustrate his
philosophy of the case, and its importance to the effectiveness of
antitrust enforcement:
We can only eat an apple a bite at a time. The end result of
consumption is the same whether it be done by quarters, halves,
three-quarters, or the whole, and is finally determined by our
own appetites. A nibbler can soon consume the whole with
a bite here and a bite there. So, whether we nibble delicately,
or gobble ravenously, the end result is, or can be, the same.
7 5
75. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 740 (E.D. Mo. 1959).
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